The principle of energy conservation is widely taken to be a se- rious difficulty for interactionist dualism (whether property or sub- stance). Interactionists often have therefore tried to make it satisfy energy conservation. This paper examines several such attempts, especially including E. J. Lowe’s varying constants proposal, show- ing how they all miss their goal due to lack of engagement with the physico-mathematical roots of energy conservation physics: the first Noether theorem (that symmetries imply conservation laws), its converse (that conservation (...) laws imply symmetries), and the locality of continuum/field physics. Thus the “conditionality re- sponse”, which sees conservation as (bi)conditional upon symme- tries and simply accepts energy non-conservation as an aspect of interactionist dualism, is seen to be, perhaps surprisingly, the one most in accord with contemporary physics (apart from quantum mechanics) by not conflicting with mathematical theorems basic to physics. A decent objection to interactionism should be a posteri- ori, based on empirically studying the brain. (shrink)

The oft-neglected issue of the causal structure in the flat spacetime approach to Einstein's theory of gravity is considered. Consistency requires that the flat metric's null cone be respected, but this does not automatically happen. After reviewing the history of this problem, we introduce a generalized eigenvector formalism to give a kinematic description of the relation between the two null cones, based on the Segre' classification of symmetric rank 2 tensors with respect to a Lorentzian metric. Then we propose a (...) method to enforce special relativistic causality by using the gauge freedom to restrict the configuration space suitably. A set of new variables just covers this smaller configuration space and respects the flat metric's null cone automatically. Respecting the flat metric's null cone ensures that the spacetime is globally hyperbolic, indicating that the Hawking black hole information loss paradox does not arise in the special relativistic approach to Einstein's theory. (shrink)

If Einstein's equations are to describe a field theory of gravity in Minkowski spacetime, then causality requires that the effective curved metric must respect the flat background metric's null cone. The kinematical problem is solved using a generalized eigenvector formalism based on the Segré classification of symmetric rank 2 tensors with respect to a Lorentzian metric. Securing the correct relationship between the two null cones dynamically plausibly is achieved using the naive gauge freedom. New variables tied to the generalized eigenvector (...) formalism reduce the configuration space to the causality-respecting part. In this smaller space, gauge transformations do not form a group, but only a groupoid. The flat metric removes the difficulty of defining equal-time commutation relations in quantum gravity and guarantees global hyperbolicity. (shrink)

A physical framework has been proposed which describes manifestly covariant relativistic evolution using a scalar time τ. Studies in electromagnetism, measurement, and the nature of time have demonstrated that in this framework, electromagnetism must be formulated in terms of τ-dependent fields. Such an electromagnetic theory has been developed. Gravitation must also use of τ-dependent fields, but many references do not take the metric's dependence on τ fully into account. Others differ markedly from general relativity in their formulation. In contrast, this (...) paper outlines steps towards a τ-dependent classical intrinsic formulation of gravitation, patterned after general relativity, which we call parametrized general relativity (PGR). Given the existence of a preferred foliation, the Hamiltonian constraint is removed. We find that some nonmetricity in the connection is allowed, unlike in general relativity. Conditions on the allowable nonmetricity are found. Consideration of the initial value problem confirms that the metric signature should normally be O(3, 2) rather than O(4, 1). Following the lead of earlier works, we argue that concatenation (integration over τ) is unnecessary for relating parametrized physics to experience, and propose an alternative to it. Finally, we compare and contrast PGR with other relevant gravitational theories. (shrink)

In a framework describing manifestly covariant relativistic evolution using a scalar time τ, consistency demands that τ-dependent fields be used. In recent work by the authors, general features of a classical parametrized theory of gravitation, paralleling general relativity where possible, were outlined. The existence of a preferred “time” coordinate τ changes the theory significantly. In particular, the Hamiltonian constraint for τ is removed From the Euler-Lagrange equations. Instead of the 5-dimensional stress-energy tensor, a tensor comprised of 4-momentum density mid flux (...) density only serves as the source. Building on that foundation, in this paper we develop a linear approximate theory of parametrized gravitation in the spirit of the flat spacetime approach to general relativity. Using a modified form of Kraichnan's flat spacetime derivation of general relativity, we extend the linear theory to a family of nonlinear theories in which the flat metric and the gravitational field coalesce into a single effective curved metric. (shrink)

Recently the neglected issue of the causal structure in the flat space-time approach to Einstein's theory of gravity has been substantially resolved. Consistency requires that the flat metric's null cone be respected by the null cone of the effective curved metric. While consistency is not automatic, thoughtful use of the naive gauge freedom resolves the problem. After briefly recapitulating how consistent causality is achieved, we consider the flat Robertson–Walker Big Bang model. The Big Bang singularity in the spatially flat Robertson–Walker (...) cosmological model is banished to past infinity in Minkowski space-time. A modified notion of singularity is proposed to fit the special relativistic approach, so that the Big Bang becomes nonsingular. (shrink)

Paralleling the formal derivation of general relativity as a flat spacetime theory, we introduce in addition a preferred temporal foliation. The physical interpretation of the formalism is considered in the context of 5-dimensional “parametrized” and 4-dimensional preferred frame contexts. In the former case, we suggest that our earlier proposal of unconcatenated parametrized physics requires that the dependence on τ be rather slow. In the 4-dimensional case, we consider and tentatively reject several areas of physics that might require a preferred foliation, (...) but find a need for one in the process (“flowing”) theory of time. We then suggest why such a foliation might reasonably be unobservable. (shrink)

Already in 1835 Lobachevski entertained the possibility of multiple geometries of the same type playing a role. This idea of rival geometries has reappeared from time to time but had yet to become a key idea in space-time philosophy prior to Brown's _Physical Relativity_. Such ideas are emphasized towards the end of Brown's book, which I suggest as the interpretive key. A crucial difference between Brown's constructivist approach to space-time theory and orthodox "space-time realism" pertains to modal scope. Constructivism takes (...) a broad modal scope in applying to all local classical field theories---modal cosmopolitanism, one might say, including theories with multiple geometries. By contrast the orthodox view is modally provincial in assuming that there exists a _unique_ geometry, as the familiar theories have. These theories serve as the "canon" for the orthodox view. Their historical roles also suggest a Whiggish story of inevitable progress. Physics literature after c. 1920 is relevant to orthodoxy primarily as commentary on the canon, which closed in the 1910s. The orthodox view explains the spatio-temporal behavior of matter in terms of the manifestation of the real geometry of space-time, an explanation works fairly well within the canon. The orthodox view, Whiggish history, and the canon have a symbiotic relationship. If one happens to philosophize about a theory outside the canon, space-time realism sheds little light on the spatio-temporal behavior of matter. Worse, it gives the _wrong_ answer when applied to an example arguably _within_ the canon, a sector of Special Relativity, namely, _massive_ scalar gravity with universal coupling. Which is the true geometry---the flat metric from the Poincare' symmetry group, the conformally flat metric exhibited by material rods and clocks, or both---or is the question faulty? How does space-time realism explain the fact that all matter fields see the same curved geometry, when so many ways to mix and match exist? Constructivist attention to dynamical details is vindicated; geometrical shortcuts can disappoint. The more exhaustive exploration of relativistic field theories in particle physics, especially massive theories, is a largely untapped resource for space-time philosophy. (shrink)

This paper takes the book named “ Thinking About Technology: the Foundations of the Philosophy of Technology” as the starting point of analysis. This book was published in 2000. we will summarize the primary idea of Joseph Pitt about Philosophy of Technology, and the debate about this book, analyze the “Phenomenon of Pitt”, that is the echo to the thought of Joseph Pitt on Philosophy of Technology. We point out at last, we should pay attention to the (...) study on the foundation of Philosophy of Technology and the institutional development of philosophy of technology. (shrink)

Hobbes’ account of these issues is conspicuously brief and puzzling. Indeed it has been criticized by some commentators as ‘confused.’ I hope to show, however, that it appears confused only because it has not been read with sufficient precision. Properly understood, Hobbes’ account is both exact and profound. It is also, in my view, far more interesting as a conception of natural right than the modern ‘confusions’ which have come to be read into it.To show this, the text must be (...) read as it is presented: on its own terms, analytically and exactly. In what follows, therefore, I shall focus upon Hobbes’ definitive account of the right of nature in chapter XIV of Leviathan, with only minimal reference to other passages and other works. I do not pretend that this is the only possible approach to Hobbes on this point; but it does show how his account may be read intelligibly, and with greater respect for the power and precision of his thought. (shrink)

The epistemic-basing relation is the relation that holds between a reason, or one’s grounds, and one’s belief when the belief is held for that reason. As I will explain, understanding this relation is crucial for epistemology since basing a belief on a reason seems necessary for epistemic justification to obtain. But what is the nature of this relation? Is it, at least in part, causal as one might assume? Or, due to problems with causal accounts, are rival accounts of the (...) basing relation motivated? That depends whether causal theories are really subject to the standard objections made against them. I will discuss what I take to be the most fundamental objection here. (shrink)

I do not approach the question of free will as a scientist, like Colin Blakemore, or a lawyer, like David Hodgson, or philosopher, like Daniel Dennett, but as a priest -- someone who feels responsible for my own actions and who is called upon to counsel and absolve such as come to me with their shame and their guilt. Should I say that their sense of responsibility is illusory? Or should I encourage them to accept responsibility, and then to deal (...) with it in the various ways -- religious, psychological and practical -- that are open to them? (shrink)

Writing in the late 1990s about the tendency of encyclopedists to designate existentialism a finished project, Thomas W. Busch cautions that such hasty periodization risks distorting our understanding of the contemporary philosophical scene and of depriving ourselves of vital resources for critiquing contemporary forms of oppression, what Garbriel Marcel referred to as processes of dehumanization. We should recall that "existentialism made possible present forms of Continental philosophy, all of which assume the existentialist critique of dualism, essentialism, and totality in modern (...) philosophy," and we should acknowledge that "existentialism remains capable of haunting today's scene as an important and relevant critic." Offered in honor of Thomas W. Busch after his more than fifty years of work in philosophy, the essays in this volume attest to existentialism as a living project. The essays are written by scholars who championed existentialism in America and by scholars who now seek to extend existentialist insights into new territory, including into research in cognitive science. The essays range from studies of key figures and texts to explorations of urgent topics such as the nature of freedom and the possibility of what Busch calls "incorporation," a sense of communicative solidarity that respects difference and disagreement. (shrink)

The main purpose of this paper is to seek a reconciliation between two apparently conflicting views of mine. I have argued (for example, Smart, 1963) for realism about theoretical entities, for example electrons, protons, photons, possibly space-time points, perhaps the ‘Y’-wave of Schrödinger’s equation and so on. Quine has also plausibly argued that we should believe in mathematical entities, since in physics we quantify over them no less than over electrons and protons. I except cases in which in physics the (...) existential quantifications are part of merely pretence discourse. Perhaps in spherical astronomy talk of the celestial sphere should be treated in this way. Alternatively the celestial sphere could be thought of realistically as a sphere whose centre is that of the earth while the stars and planets are thought of (or correlated with) points or small areas on the sphere’s surface in their lines of sight. I am not concerned in this paper to delimit fact from fiction in scientific discourse. The settlement of borderline disputes can wait for another occasion. My main argument for scientific realism is the cosmic coincidence argument. Would it not be a cosmic coincidence if the world were merely as if there were electrons, protons, etc?1. (shrink)